Independent Journal (New York)
January 26, 1788
A nation comprised of states (or provinces) will inevitably have tension between the national government and each of the state governments. Most frequently, at the center of that tension is sovereignty; one state’s policy preference may be anathema to another state.
(more…)New-York Packet
January 25, 1788
The Federalist XLIV [James Madison] Part II Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution has long sparked controversy, granting Congress the power to create necessary and proper laws to execute its other powers. James Madison, in the Federalist Papers, defended this provision against those who deemed it excessive. For Constitution supporters, the Clause was crucial to prevent Congress from becoming ineffective and unimportant compared to state legislatures. James Madison argued that the Clause was essential, otherwise, the Constitution would become meaningless.
Everywhere in the city, which had become his home, there were reminders of the inspiration he had brought.
New-York Packet
January 25, 1788
In a country comprised of states, there is bound to be overlap between what those states’ governments may do and what the federal government may do. But the draft Constitution clarified those boundaries and identified many of the rights that states have and don’t have. Crucially, the Constitution sets limits for what states may do to hinder their economies and to prosecute criminal behavior.
(more…)Independent Journal (New York)
January 19, 1788
Engineering a coup can be difficult. Usually, it requires a military to not only lose faith in the civilian government but to organize an overthrowing of that government. Democratic republics fear this prospect as much as any other type of government. Although democratic republics are better suited for allowing their citizens to vent their anger—through the vote, protest, and other expressions of speech—and presumably have a healthier, happier citizenry as a result, the threat still lingers. And during any period of American history, the potential for a standing army—one of permanence and at times one of substantial size—has raised the specter of a military coup on top of the obvious dedication of resources needed to support a standing army.
(more…)“Publius,” The Federalist IX [Alexander Hamilton]
Independent Journal (New York), November 21, 1787
Following are excerpts from Alexander Hamilton’s writings in the Federalist Papers:
“When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions, far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. (more…)
“Publius,” The Federalist VIII [Alexander Hamilton]
New-York Packet, November 20, 1787
Following are excerpts from The Federalist VIII, authored by Alexander Hamilton:
“Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general confederacy, (more…)
While during the American Revolution, the judiciary was mostly forgotten, in the interest of controlling gubernatorial power by empower legislatures, that began to change during the 1780s.
William Findley, a man of Irish descent who came to play a powerful role in Pennsylvanian politics, had an idea about what a politician should be. He said that politicians should be able to advocate for their own cause when they take the floor, that politicians should openly support their interests. Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty, 221. As Gordon Wood explained in Empire of Liberty, this idea challenged “the entire classical tradition of disinterested public leadership and set[] forth a rationale for a competitive interest-laden politics . . . .” id.
James Madison, in Federalist No. 10, feared such a thing: that politicians may be deciding issues that directly affect their interests.
Nonetheless, the American system has undoubtedly embraced such a principle. Politicians, perhaps now more than ever, are influenced by their own interests, which are shaped by various donations, gifts, and promises of future favors.
There is a significant question underlying all of this: Did the Founding Fathers contemplate that a representative democracy could transform itself into a system where the politicians are only representative of their constituencies to the extent those constituencies benefit from the donations, gifts, and promises of future favors?
Some may argue that the representative nature of the republic was and still is affected by this system. Politicians are elected based on their promises of what they will do for others, but when in office, perhaps their self-interests are the only ones that matter. Then, to the extent those self-interests align with their constituency, their record serves as a platform for re-elections.
Perhaps it is simply too idealistic to expect politicians to put their self-interests aside and govern with an even hand, representing the best interests of their constituents, not themselves. Regardless, there appears to be no question that Findley’s ideal politician has become the norm for politicians.
Had Madison known what would happen to politicians, he may not have been surprised, but he would have been disappointed.
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